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STATUTORY PENALTIES AND CLASS ACTIONS: SOCIAL
JUSTICE OR LEGALIZED EXTORTION?
PAUL KARLSGODT†
Privacy protection involves a particularly knotty set of questions for
consumer protection laws. Increasingly complex technology and the
exponential proliferation of electronic data storage have created an everincreasing risk of exposing consumer data to unauthorized access and
identity theft. The decreasing cost of and access to communications
technology has created the ability to bombard consumers with spam and
other unwanted communications. Consumers themselves are highly
supportive of legislation enacted to protect their private data from unauthorized transfer, use, and disclosure and from unnecessary intrusions
into their right to be left alone. On the other hand, determining appropriate civil remedies for violations of these laws is difficult because injuries
resulting from a privacy breach are often unquantifiable.
Statutory damages offer a solution for many of these competing
problems. The prospect of a set monetary recovery of $100, $1,000, or
even $5,000 for each violation of a privacy law may incentivize plaintiffs
to pursue claims for violations when they otherwise would not bother to
do so. Statutory damages also provide a solution to the problem of actual
damages being difficult to quantify. Making a company or individual
liable for a specific amount of statutory damages for each violation creates a financial deterrent to unscrupulous behavior and an inducement to
adopt measures that protect customer and other consumer data.
STATUTORY DAMAGES AND CLASS ACTIONS
Despite these laudable goals, the ability to aggregate statutory damages across large populations of consumers makes privacy laws with
statutory damages remedies highly susceptible to abuse. Statutory damages cases are an attractive target for consumer class actions because the
pre-specified amount and the arguably automatic nature of the remedy
can eliminate key barriers to class certification in consumer class actions,
such as proof of specific injury and damages. Aggregating thousands or
even millions of individual claims for statutory damages creates the potential for huge monetary exposure, and therefore huge settlements.
Huge settlements, in turn, create huge contingent fees.
† Mr. Karlsgodt is a partner at Baker & Hostetler LLP in Denver, where he serves as the
Denver Office Litigation Coordinator and is the national chair of the firm’s Class Action Defense
practice team. He is the editor and primary contributor to the legal blog www.classactionblawg.com.
Paul Karlsgodt served as Articles Editor for the University of Denver Law Review in 1996-97.
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Statutory damages class actions often threaten companies and individuals with annihilating civil exposure for technical violations of laws
that do not create any appreciable injuries to consumers, or that are far in
excess of any actual injury. The exposure is often so large that the
amount of the potential recovery alone can be used as leverage to convince a defendant to settle, regardless of the merits of the underlying
claims.
PRIVACY LAWS WITH STATUTORY DAMAGES OR PENALTY REMEDIES
Laws providing for statutory damages or penalties in the privacy area generally fall into two categories: 1) laws prohibiting certain acts of
invasion of privacy; and 2) laws prohibiting the intentional or negligent
disclosure of private information.
An example of a statute prohibiting invasions of privacy is the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA),1 which prohibits unsolicited automated communications, including faxes and robo-calls.
Courts have recently interpreted the TCPA to also prohibit unsolicited
text messages.2 Statutory penalties for violations start at $500 per call
and can be trebled to $1,500 for willful and wanton violations.3
There are numerous laws imposing statutory penalties for intentional or negligent disclosures of personal information. These laws have
recently been the subject of class actions arising from data breaches in
various contexts.4 California’s Confidentiality of Medical Information
Act (CMIA) entitles a person to $1,000 in “nominal” damages for a release of confidential medical information.5 The CMIA has recently been
the subject of numerous data breach class actions against hospitals and
other health care providers. These suits have arisen out of thefts of computers or other unintentional acts that allegedly compromised patient
data, notwithstanding the lack of any evidence of identity theft or other
unauthorized use of the data following the theft. The remedies sought by
the plaintiffs in some of these cases exceed $1 billion in “nominal” damages.

1. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2010).
2. Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946 (2009).
3. Another example is the California Privacy Act, Section 630 et seq., California Penal
Code, which prohibits monitoring or recording of confidential telephone conversations without the
consent of both parties to the conversation, and imposes a statutory penalty of $5,000.
4. Two examples include the federal Fair and Accurate Transactions Act (FACTA), 15
U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1) (2012), which prohibits merchants from printing more than five digits of a
consumer’s credit card number on a credit card receipt and imposes damages of “not less than $100
and not more than $1,000” per violation, and the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710
(2013), which prohibits disclosure of consumer data about consumers’ video habits and imposes up
to $2,500 per violation.
5. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 56.36(B) (West 2013).

2013]

STATUTORY PENALTIES AND CLASS ACTIONS

45

THE DEBATE OVER CLASS ACTIONS FOR ANNIHILATING STATUTORY
DAMAGES
Proponents of class actions for statutory damages or penalties may
argue that they are a necessary deterrent to intentional, reckless, or negligent behavior, and that they are justified by the difficulty in assessing
damages for real but unquantifiable harm. Even conceding that these
objectives are legitimate, the existence of legitimate objectives doesn’t
answer the question of whether allowing aggregated statutory damages is
the best way to achieve them. Deterrence can also be achieved through
existing regulation and governmental oversight.6 In practical application,
data privacy class actions often do little to provide affected individuals
with any significant monetary recovery. Settlements in privacy cases
often involve no direct monetary benefits to class members because the
per-person settlement amount would be too small to justify the cost of
distributing the funds.7
Proponents also argue that privacy class actions are usually settled
for far less than the maximum amount of possible statutory damages, so
damages in these cases are not in fact annihilating. This pragmatic argument is hardly a justification for creating the threat of potentially
bankrupting liability for trivial breaches of privacy interests. What’s
more, the possibility of an astronomical statutory exposure that bears no
reasonable nexus either to any conceivable harm or wrongdoing by the
defendant puts the court in an impossible situation in evaluating the fairness of any settlement. In a case where the possible statutory damages
are $1 billion, what is a fair settlement? $1 million? $10 million? $100
million? If legislation provides no guidance for this question, the court’s
decision becomes arbitrary. If no one really believes that the full amount
of the statutory damages will ever be awarded, the law should reflect that
reality.
EXISTING JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS
Court decisions have tempered the devastating impact of statutory
damages class actions in some circumstances, but each judicial solution
has its loopholes.

6. See, e.g., Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH)
Act, passed as part of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), Pub. L. No. 1115, 123 Stat. 115 (2009), and regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act.
7. See, e.g., Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement and Provisional Class Certification
Order, Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., No. CV-11-01726-RS, 2012 WL 6013427, at *1 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 3,
2012). The settlement as preliminarily approved in Fraley entitles class members to make a claim
for a cash award of up to $10 out of a common fund, but if the number of claimants is so high that
each claimant’s proportionate share would be less than $5, then the entire amount will be paid to
charity. See Joint Motion for Settlement, Fraley, No. CV-11-01726-RS (N.D. Cal., Dec. 3, 2012);
Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Revised Settlement (dated October 12, 2012), Fraley, No.
CV-11-01726-RS (N.D. Cal., Dec. 3, 2012), Attachment 1.
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In some contexts, the lack of injury prevents statutory damages
class actions from being pursued in the federal courts on the ground that
the Article III injury-in-fact standing requirement has not been satisfied.8
However, state law standing requirements are often less stringent, and
standing can often be established simply where a person is within the
class of persons intended to be protected by a statutory damages scheme,
whether or not the person suffered any measurable injury.9
By contrast, at least one state, New York, has a specific statute prohibiting class actions for statutory penalties. In Shady Grove Orthopedic
Associates v. Allstate,10 however, the United States Supreme Court held
that the New York law is a procedural law that does not apply in federal
court actions involving New York disputes; therefore, it held that a class
action for statutory penalties under New York law was not barred in the
federal courts.11
One argument raised in early class actions involving potentially annihilating statutory damages liability was that the potential of putting a
defendant out of business defeated the superiority element required for
class certification. Courts found that class actions were not the superior
means of resolving claims because the potential liability in a class action
would put the defendant out of business and because statutory penalties
themselves facilitated individual lawsuits.12 More recently, as illustrated
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Bateman v. American
Multi-Cinema, Inc.,13 courts have rejected the idea that the potential for
annihilating liability is a basis for finding a lack of superiority.
As in the context of large punitive damages awards, due process
may provide a limitation on aggregation of statutory damages. The
practical problem with this limitation is that the defendant may have to
incur a judgment for the excessive amount before most courts will consider the due process issue ripe for review.14

8. See, e.g., Willey v. J.P. Morgan Chase, N.A., No. CV-1397-CM, 2009 WL 1938987, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2009); but see Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 2012)
(holding that plaintiff “alleged sufficient facts to confer standing.”).
9. See, e.g., Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 4th 980 (2009).
10. 130 S.Ct. 1431 (2010).
11. Id. at 1444.
12. See, e.g., Spikings v. Cost Plus, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44214 (C.D. Cal. May 25, 2007).
13. 623 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2010).
14. See Parker v. Time Warner Enter. Co., 331 F.3d 13, 21-22 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that
due process issue was premature at the class certification stage because the threat of annihilating
damages remained hypothetical). One way that some courts have addressed due process concerns is
through the common law doctrine of remittitur. See Sony BMG Music Enter. v. Tennenbaum, 721 F.
Supp. 2d 85, 121(D. Mass. 2010) (granting Defendant’s Motion for New Trial or Remittitur “in so
far as it seeks a reduction in the jury’s award on the grounds that it is so grossly excessive as to
violate the Constitution”).
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PATHS TO REFORM
Reform must start with legislative recognition that creating a statutory damages remedy will likely transform the statute into a magnet for
class actions. In view of this reality, statutory damages provisions
should be limited in such a way that they are not susceptible to abuse
through the aggregation of claims in a class action. Examples of potential limits on statutory damages provisions include 1) prohibiting aggregation of statutory damages in class actions altogether; 2) placing specific statutory caps on the amounts that can be awarded in class actions; 3)
limiting the individual amounts that could be awarded depending on the
number of claimants in a particular case; or 4) permitting only opt-in
collective actions that require the affirmative participation of each plaintiff.
Even these sorts of limitations would not be a perfect solution,
however. Limiting class recoveries solves the problem of creating unintentionally high liability, but it also creates the problem of individual
awards being so small that they cannot economically be distributed to
class members. It may be that statutory damages are simply irreconcilable with class action litigation.

